The seismic Turkish election of 3 November 2002 was a peaceful, democratic expression of the deep anger felt by Turkish voters toward a political establishment known more for economic populism, clientelism, and corruption than for democratic accountability. Voters turned the tables on the established political class by completely reordering Turkey's parliament and political landscape, bringing the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) 363 of the 541 elected seats in the unicameral Grand National Assembly, and leaving every other party except Kemal Atatürk's old Republican People's Party (CHP, 178 seats) shut completely out of that institution.
By 2002, having endured for years the terrible and chronic damage that such problematic governments could do to effective governance and accountability, the voters were ready to cry "Enough!" and to opt instead for a ruling structure that offered the prospect of being more responsive to society and its needs. As a further consequence of these dynamics, the victory of the AKP was welcomed across the various segments of Turkish society despite what some Turks see as that party's questionable provenance: The AKP is one of two parties that succeeded the Islamist-oriented Virtue (Fazilet) Party after the Constitutional Court banned it as a threat to the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic.
Is the postelection optimism about the AKP justified? How successful will the party be at governing Turkey's 68 million people effectively and democratically? How adept will it prove at addressing the problems of joblessness, poverty, and economic growth? To answer these questions, one must analyze both the unique historical circumstances in which the November 2002 voting took place and the AKP's methods of presenting itself to voters and mobilizing support. In our opinion, the key to understanding the events of last fall lies in the insights offered by sociology and the study of political economy. Such an approach, we believe, allows one to assess the AKP without ideological prejudice and yet also to take a sober view of the internal contradictions, inherent limitations, and democratic shortfalls that may rise in salience as this new and largely untested party goes from campaigning as a challenger to governing the Turkish Republic with a decisive parliamentary majority.
A Peculiar Election
Why did Turkish politics come to a turning point in the fall of 2002 when the next regularly scheduled parliamentary election was not even due to be held until the spring of 2004? How did the AKP benefit-both generally and through its own deliberate actions-from this situation? The answer is twofold, and goes to the heart of what made the 2002 vote so different from previous elections, such as those of 1995 and 1999. First, the central issue was not Kurdish nationalism or political Islam, but the troubled economy. In both 1995 and 1999, parties had relatively little room for political maneuver since the race was dominated by the question of how best to protect the secular and unitary foundations of the Republic against perceived threats from Islamist and Kurdish sources. The prosaic business of proposing ways to solve the problems and meet the needs of society took second place to dramatic questions of state security and political stability. The parties that fared the best, including the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), had state-centered or nationalist agendas.
Second, while the principal dramatis personae of the 1995 and 1999 elections were political parties and the state or its organs, the 2002 results were swayed not only by parties but by nonstate actors such as economic pressure groups, civil society organizations, and even international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). These indirect actors helped to shape the election by stressing the need for a strong and stable government. They also served as important discursive reference points amid which political parties could position themselves as they framed their own platforms. There seems to be little doubt that the presence of these nonstate actors was significant and favored the AKP and the CHP. The importance of the IMF and the EU (the latter of which Turkey still hopes to join, not least for the economic advantages membership will bring) signaled that the 2002 elections were not merely a national, but also a "globalized" affair with the economy at the center. 1 The distinctive themes of the 2002 election, in other words, were society and its prosperity rather than the state and its security. The reason for the shift is not hard to see: Recent years have seen the worst economic crisis in modern Turkish history. Every party had to explain how it would attack the devastating problems of economic contraction, unemployment, and poverty. The parlous state of the Turkish economyand not ideology of any stripe, whether Islamist or otherwise-is what swept the AKP into power and swept all the established parties except the CHP completely out of parliament.
We should note, however, that the centrality of the economy in the minds of Turkish voters signaled neither an unquestioning commitment to the neoliberal ideology of free markets nor a longing for some kind of state-led national-development strategy. What Turks voted for was neither neoliberalism nor dirigisme, but rather the promise of an intermediate way between the extremes of freedom and regulation. Or to put this in terms that might seem more plainly relevant to most of the voting public, coping effectively with the crisis had to mean both promoting growth after years in which the economy had shrunk by close to 10 percent and targeting large and persistent pockets of poverty and unemployment. Economic growth is indispensable; so is social justice. The best chance of obtaining both, as the AKP leadership seems to grasp, is to have an effective state that can underwrite and safeguard a basically free but intelligently regulated market economy.
If this proposition sounds familiar, it should. In the current global context, it goes by the name of "the third way." Perhaps best known today as a concept associated with Tony Blair's New Labour government in Britain, third-way thinking represents an alternative approach to modernization that sees the political order, the economic order, and the question of social justice (including minimal standards of social welfare, distributive fairness, and respect for cultural differences) as cooperating parts of a dynamic whole governed according to the principle of liberty under law. way offers a method of handling the challenges with which our globalized age is confronting national societies.
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In light of the foregoing, it makes sense to say that what transpired in Turkey last November 3 was a delayed embrace of the global third way. Only those parties that adapted themselves to this new agenda fared well on that day. The rest found themselves sidelined with their futures gravely in doubt.
How the AKP Succeeded
The centrality of economic issues, the salience of the third way, and the multiplicity of actors involved in the November 2002 election suggest insights into the AKP's victory (as well as the quantitative but not qualitative success of the CHP). The AKP strategy for winning support from the various segments of Turkish society had three dimensions. First, AKP leaders such as Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdo¢ gan distanced their party from the Islamist label and sought to appeal to the widest possible swath of voters by presenting their party as a centerright formation that was ready to face the urgent problems of the Turkish economy with well-thought-out policies energetically pursued.
Second after this emphasis on competence over ideology was a message of integrity and fairness. Taking aim at things such as "the cronyism and corruption that have hobbled Turkey's banking and financial system for decades," 3 the AKP argued that sustainable economic recovery could never happen without honesty and accountability in government. Party leaders also pointed out that respect for justice would require not only strict probity, but also the readiness to listen caringly to different segments of society, especially those hardest hit by job losses, poverty, and insecurity. The CHP, by contrast, did not seem as ready to listen and hewed to former economy minister and World Bank vice-president Kemal Derviº's unquestioning acceptance of IMF-mandated structural adjustment as the cornerstone of economic policy. The AKP shrewdly sharpened its difference with the CHP on this point, vowing to keep problems of "social and distributive injustice" at the center of its immediate concerns even if the IMF disapproved.
Third, the AKP said over and over that democracy constitutes the fundamental and effective basis for the long-term solution to Turkey's problems. Since the election, this heavy and special emphasis on democracy has continued to be a major theme in the AKP's discourse on the protection of individual rights and freedoms, as well as in its support for the additional internal reforms that will have to occur if Turkey is ever to accede to full EU membership.
These three themes-competence, integrity, and democracy-were the keys to the AKP's ability to forge organic links with society, convince voters that it was more center-right than Islamist, and win the election. These themes allowed the AKP convincingly to set itself apart from its rivals by: 1) charging that the three governing-coalition parties (DSP and MHP plus the Motherland Party [ANAP]) were too close to the state establishment and too distant from economic lobbying groups and civil society organizations; 2) assuring voters that a wholehearted commitment to democracy, secularism, and religious pluralism made the AKP decisively different from its Islamist forebears; and 3) suggesting that the CHP and Kemal Derviº were too technocratic and too worried about the IMF, yet not worried enough about social justice or the need to support the small and medium-sized enterprises that form the potentially most vibrant sector of the Turkish economy.
A New Synthesis?
By adroitly highlighting these differences, the AKP built up its support rapidly, especially among the small and medium-scale businesspeople whose numbers and influence have made them a growing force in Turkish society. The AKP also established ties with the poor and mobilized civil society organizations whose primary aims have less to do with economics than with promoting respect and recognition for Muslim believers. While support from this last set of groups was significant, it remains true that what put the AKP over the top was the economic crisis and voters' urgent desire for solutions to the problems of unemployment, poverty, and economic growth.
The program that the AKP put forward to win public confidence was a synthesis of communitarian (or conservative) and liberal elements. It has three main principles.
The first is an effective and "postdevelopmental" state that is democratic, transparent, and accountable to society, but at the same time "caring" and not afraid to play a role in overseeing the economy. A postdevelopmental state is neither the minimal state envisaged by neoliberalism nor the powerful state performing the dominant role in the economy that characterized the earlier era of import-substitution and planned development. Instead, it is a state that effectively contributes to the development of a free-market economy without actually repressing the market mechanism. In doing so, the postdevelopmental state aspires to play an important role in promoting both economic growth and distributive justice at the same time. In this context, the AKP claims that in its governing, not only will it change the existing state structure which is detached from society, blind to societal needs and demands, and therefore functions as a closed, ineffective and undemocratic system of rule, but also it will create an effective and postdevelopmental state.
The second major pillar of the AKP's approach to governance is a market that is regulated closely enough to keep it honest and to prevent destructive side effects and externalities, but with plenty of free space left for enterprise, innovation, and investment. In this sense, the AKP argues that it promotes a free-market economy and sees it as the basis for the growth that Turkey needs to become fully modernized, financially stable, and robustly industrialized.
Third and finally, there is social justice. To the AKP, this term refers both to the need for some basic level of fairness in the distribution of material goods and services and to the need for full equality of respect and recognition across Turkish society such that no citizen is treated invidiously on the grounds of religious affiliation or ethnocultural identity. Unlike the CHP, the AKP does not see the question of social justice as an indirect problem that will be solved when the primary challenge of economic growth has been met. To bolster its case, the AKP adopts its own version of the logic of indirectness by arguing that promoting fairness and equal respect is an oblique but effective way to foster the widespread social trust that every sophisticated modern economy requires. 4 At its most general, the communitarian-liberal synthesis means reconciling the free market with community values, religious beliefs, societal norms, and local traditions. More concretely, the communitarianliberal synthesis calls for a just society organized not on the basis of pure egotistical individualism, but according to the ideal of a democratically regulated state-society relationship in which the "thin" instrumental rationality of the free market is supplemented and guided by the "dense" moral context of what Prime Minister Abdullah Gül calls "moderate and democratic Muslim society."
How the Center-Left Failed
At first glance, the CHP looks like the other big winner from last November's vote. Certainly the party's showing represented a huge improvement over 1999, when it failed to pass the 10 percent threshold and found itself shut out of parliament. To a degree, the CHP simply reaped the benefits of being an outsider at a time when angry voters were intent on "throwing the rascals out." Also helpful was the "new blood" brought by the highly respected technocrat Kemal Derviº, whose decision in the summer of 2002 to abandon his officially nonpartisan stance and join the CHP gave the party a renovated appearance even while its membership and views on policy remained basically unchanged. Although Derviº's strong identification with the IMF and structural adjustment alienated parts of the traditional CHP base, his presence on the ticket seems clearly to have drawn more voters than it drove away.
When one looks more closely, however, the CHP appears to have fumbled an opportunity so big that its failure as much as the AKP's success should be the headline story of the 2002 election. With voters hungry for change and desperate for a voice, the CHP misgauged the public mood and left a large vacuum that the AKP, to its credit, nimbly filled. What explains the CHP's blunder? First, the party failed to create a strong impression that it cared deeply about the daunting economic hardships and disparities with which voters had to cope. Derviº's vague references to "a social-liberal synthesis" were too little, too late. Second, CHP elites had never bothered to try and build up a grassroots structure that could come close to matching that of the AKP, and also could not rival the record that city governments run by the AKP's predecessor parties had compiled in the 1990s. The contrast between Derviº the former World Bank official and Erdo¢ gan the ex-mayor of Istanbul sums up the asymmetry.
Second, the CHP has been slow to appeal to those who work for or own small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Indeed, the failure of center-left, allegedly social-democratic parties to recruit SMEs into their electoral coalition has been notable for some time, and is another error of omission that Islamist parties have learned to exploit with great skill over the last decade or so. 5 Third, the CHP suffered from its legacy of close ties to the tradition of Turkish statism, with all the taste for centralization, top-down decision making, and "establishmentarian" thinking this implies. The AKP took pains to show that it cared about the needs and hopes of society at large-including the nonmaterial aspirations for recognition that were at work in such highly charged questions as whether Muslim women can legally wear headscarves in certain public settings. The leaders of the CHP showed little sensitivity on this score and little desire to present innovative solutions to economic problems. On the interconnected issues of democratic reform and full EU membership, the CHP was and remains lukewarm: more or less officially supporting both, but without much energy or conviction.
It is probably not going too far to say that the AKP, in spite of its strong Islamist roots, has looked far more like a European social-democratic party of the "third way" type, repeatedly stressing its commitment to EU-related reforms and the goal of a pluralist and multicultural society both before and after November 3. 6 The CHP, meanwhile, has continued to appear stodgy and even archaic, impervious alike to changing local demands and shifting global dynamics. When one considers the intensity of the contacts that have taken place over the last few years between the CHP and its nominal European counterparts over EU-membership questions and the like, the stubborn passivity of the CHP becomes all the more baffling and paradoxical.
Perhaps part of the explanation for the CHP's hidebound character lies in its strongly hierarchical organization and lack of internal debate over key policy issues. As a result, there has been little challenge from within CHP ranks to the leadership's continuing preoccupation with a rather narrow and outdated notion of national sovereignty. Again, the AKP appears to be reaping the benefits of having taken a different road: It boasts a much wider streak of intraparty democracy and much livelier internal debates over key policy issues, and consequently has been consistently faster and smarter at the art of responding to changing public attitudes and political circumstances.
Challenges for the AKP
The triumph of the communitarian-liberal ideal last November should not be taken lightly. At long last, it has given Turkey a chance for strong, stable, and responsive government-a chance that may not return soon, if it ever does. There is an opportunity to close the gap between an ineffective state and a changing society that remains one of the worst legacies of the 1990s, and to put political life on a more democratic footing. If this opening can be seized, Turkey's limping economy and all the hopes riding on it will enjoy much better prospects, and the EU will find the grounds on which it can deny Ankara full membership steadily dwindling as the Turkish Republic makes impressive strides toward democratic consolidation and material development.
But can the AKP pull it off? The obstacles are surely formidable, and spring from four major clusters of issues. First is the matter of dealings with the EU and the state of the Cyprus dispute. Second is the question of the IMF and the impact of its conditionalities on the future of Turkish economy. Third is the looming prospect (at the time of this writing in late February 2003) of a U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the state of Ankara's relations with Washington. Fourth are the unresolved questions that hang in the air between the Islamic-rooted AKP and the resolutely secular Turkish state establishment, particularly the armed forces but also the judicial system and the bureaucracy.
In the argot of political science, these issues are structural and not conjunctural: They touch on deep questions about the basic character of Turkey and its institutions, and they transcend the specific agenda of any particular government. The ones that touch on economics and foreign policy are the most urgent, and indeed are shaping politics in Turkey today.
As soon as it took office in November, the new AKP government began trying to face these challenges forcefully and squarely. With an EU summit slated for Copenhagen in December, the AKP found itself with the tough task of obtaining a definite date for Turkey's accession to full membership. While the AKP did convince the EU that it is not an Islamist formation but a center-right party that strongly supports secular government and the accession process, it received only a "conditional" rather than a "determined" date on which negotiations are to begin, and for 2004 rather than 2003. In the meantime, Turkey is to continue the process of meeting the standards for EU membership laid down at Copenhagen. Turkey has already managed to accomplish important legal changes involving the abolition of capital punishment and the protection of individual rights and freedoms-a key component of which is the granting to minorities the right to express their own cultural identities-in the period leading to the Copenhagen Summit. What is critical from the EU perspective, however, is the proper implementation of these pathbreaking changes.
While the Copenhagen decision was a step forward, the EU could have made the AKP government's work much easier by sending a stronger signal such as a December 2003 conditional date. As it is, Prime Minister Gül and his cabinet must take their half-a-loaf from Copenhagen and push on with the economic program while also making complex, high-stakes decisions regarding Iraq and the dispute-ridden island of Cyprus, where thousands of Turkish troops remain in a northern republic whose government is officially recognized by no capital in the world besides Ankara.
The Copenhagen Summit showed clearly that the possibility of Turkey's accession to Europe depends on the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Both the application of the Copenhagen criteria, which will mean the end of the strong-state tradition in Turkey, and the Cyprus conflict pose a great challenge to the AKP. And yet it is fair to say that far more than its rivals (including the CHP), the AKP has shown itself ready to move ahead with both the EU-related democratization agenda and innovative solutions to the Cyprus dispute (such as the plan offered by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan). 7 Nevertheless, both issues could create grave tensions in Ankara: There is a serious gap between the AKP's pragmatism and the intense concern for sovereignty that has long been a staple of the Turkish state, and the EU's failure to do more to support Turkey's domestic "pro-EU coalition" is not helping. 8 Similarly, the AKP's support for a U.S.-led assault on Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq could create a split between the party's leaders and their constituents, especially if the war goes badly or otherwise produces problematic results such as the rise of a full-fledged Kurdish state or states in northern Iraq. 9 By the very nature of the case, Turkey's possible direct involvement in a war against another Muslim country would seem to be almost uniquely troublesome for the Islamic-rooted AKP. While the fallout from an invasion remains unknowable at the time of this writing, the stakes are clearly very high for the AKP in particular as well as for Turkey and the region in general. The Gül government stated fairly early that it would support a UN-authorized invasion, and by late February was finishing its bargaining with Washington over the exact terms of Turkey's participation as a member of the "coalition of the willing" in a possible U.S.-led military operation even if no UN Security Council action beyond Resolution 1441 (passed unanimously in November 2002) were taken to sanction the use of force against Saddam Hussein. As the AKP government pressed hard for the best deal that it could get from the United States, one of Foreign Minister Yasar Yakiº's argu-ments almost surely consisted of pointing to the enormous risk of a domestic backlash that he and his colleagues would be running.
The third possible challenge for the AKP concerns the IMF. Simply put, any Turkish government has to cope with the IMF and the demands that come attached to its loans and credits. This is a fact of life in a developing-world country with a struggling economy, and the AKP government is no exception to the rule. The reality of structural-adjustment and other IMF conditionalities limits the AKP's maneuvering room visa-vis economic policy. Attempts by the AKP government to act on its aspirations toward greater social and distributive justice could make for rocky going with the IMF, as could efforts to stimulate activity by small and medium-sized enterprises if IMF officials see those efforts as a threat to macroeconomic stability. And yet both the AKP's principles and its voters call for action on those fronts, so a degree of friction with the IMF will have to be risked.
The formation of the AKP government has raised citizens' and investors' confidence in the economy. After so many years of unsteady or ineffectual coalitions, Turkey has finally elected a single-party government that strongly believes in economic reform, basically respects the IMF framework, and wants full-fledged EU membership. The new government's obvious sense of purpose and resolve helped to lower interest rates and boosted the prospects of economic recovery and a reduced debt burden (Turkey's current debts are massive). But all honeymoons must draw to a close, and the AKP's ended around New Year's 2003 as investors at home and abroad became increasingly concerned about what they saw as a lack of coherence in government policy plus certain deviations from key IMF norms. Exhibit A was parliament's credibility-damaging failure, amid splits in top AKP ranks, to pass crucial corruption-fighting legislation designed to make the process of spending public money more transparent and accountable.
Similar snags have impeded progress in other spheres of economic reform. Critics point to insufficient government support for banking and finance regulators, to a decision to hike pension increases above the level of inflation without spelling out a noninflationary method of financing the raise, and so on. Clearly, the uncertainty surrounding the new government's handling of these and other highly sensitive economic issues has cost it some of its early political capital. Since economic policy is make-or-break territory for the AKP, the tensions that it has already felt between what its constituents demand and what the IMF and the financial community want must give party leaders pause.
Finally, dealings between the AKP and the state establishment could easily grow antagonistic. The likeliest flashpoint is the intensely fraught headscarf issue, which has become a high-profile vehicle for the tensions and anxieties that attend upon a predominantly Muslim society governed by a militantly secular state. Again, the AKP finds itself be-tween a rock and a hard place: If it backs Muslim women who want to wear head coverings wherever they go, the secular elite will fear that political Islam has become dangerous, just as that elite feared six years ago when the military-dominated National Security Council forced the AKP's predecessor party to resign from the governing coalition. 10 Yet should the AKP ignore or straddle the issue, it will anger and disappoint its own most ardent supporters. Since the AKP's predecessors wound up being banned by the Constitutional Court after that body ruled that they had rejected the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic, the danger for the new government here is all too apparent.
During the winter of 2002-03, the AKP leadership focused singlemindedly on urgent economic and foreign policy issues, leaving sensitive topics such as the headscarf question for the future. Postponement is not resolution, however, and a large share of AKP voters clearly expects the government to defend the wearing of headscarves as a matter of right. Party leaders will remain wary, having learned the lesson of what the Kemalist state apparatus did to the AKP's predecessor parties when they waxed too "Islamic." The AKP is also well aware that the EU is watching, and has laid down its own markers regarding the conduct of Turkish domestic politics.
11 The EU's influence cuts two ways: While the nations of Europe endorse the expansion of religious freedom, they also dislike anything that smacks of "religious fundamentalism" and probably share the Turkish state's suspicion that the AKP is an Islamist faction rather than a "normal" center-right formation. Can the AKP thread this particular needle and craft a compromise on this "hot-button" identity issue that will both please its core supporters and stay safely within the "red lines" drawn by the EU and the secular Turkish establishment? Only time will tell. Among other things, this uncertainty underlines the truth that while the AKP may be the sole party in government, it is not the only power in Turkey and is not yet capable of ruling according to its own economic, political, and cultural agenda. We know that the communitarian-liberal synthesis-or at least the aspiration toward it-succeeded at the polls in November 2002. What we do not know so far is whether it can be put into service as a program for actual governance. Electoral success is one thing; power is another. Will the former translate into the latter? The answer to that question will determine the nature of Turkish politics and the fate of the AKP in the uncertain months ahead.
The voters of Turkey have opened a door that may yet lead to economic stability and fuller democracy for their country. Whether these goals will be realized, however, depends not only on the AKP's willingness to govern democratically but also on society's will to keep up the momentum toward democratic consolidation. Significant challenges are likely to arise, notably in the domain of civil-military relations, the development of a pluralist civil society, and the promotion of intraparty democracy. The AKP cannot advance the cause of democratic consolidation on its own. It will need the help of society if Turkey is going to have any chance of avoiding the risks and reaping the fruits of its delayed encounter with the politics of the third way in the age of globalization.
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